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Contrariety and Change: Problems Plato Set for Aristotle
James Bogen (Pitzer College)
Charles M. Young (Claremont Graduate School)
I
Plato and Aristotle each believe that contrariety is fundamental to the analysis o f change. At 
Phaedo 7 0 e4 -7 1 a l0 , for example, Socrates says that all things that have an origin (εχει γ ενέσ ιν) 
and that have contraries (ενα ντία 1 ) come to be (γίγνεται) out o f (έκ) contraries. Thus if  som e­
thing com es to be greater, it must previously have been smaller, and vice versa. Other illustrations 
include coming to be weaker, faster, better, and more just from the contrary conditions. “Every­
thing,” Socrates says, “comes to be in this way: contrary things from contraries” (Phaedo 71a9- 
10). Aristotle expresses a remarkably similar view at Physics 1.5, 188b21-26:
[A ]ll things that come to be, come to be out o f contraries (έξ εναντίω ν), and all 
things that pass away, pass away into their contraries or intermediates between 
(ενς ενα ντία  και τα τούτων μεταξύ). And the intermediates are out o f contraries.
For example, colors come to be out o f pale and dark (έκ λευκοΰ και μ ελανός).
And so all o f the things that come to be by nature are either contraries or things 
that come to be out o f contraries.2
Although the Phaedo offers different examples and says nothing about intermediates,3 there are 
enough sim ilarities between the passages from the Phaedo and the Physics to commit both Plato 
and Aristotle to the idea that all things have their origins in contraries.
If we wish to understand Plato’s and Aristotle’s accounts o f change, then, we must first un­
derstand their accounts o f contrariety. Their accounts differ on a number o f points. They disagree 
profoundly on the ontology o f contrary features. Aristotle formulates a definition o f contrariety; 
Plato never does.4 They even disagree about what features count as contraries: largeness and 
sm allness, for example, are star examples o f contraries for Plato, but Aristotle denies that these 
features are contraries at all (see Categories 6, 5b 14-29). \Ve believe that the story o f how Plato 
mid Aristotle came to hold the views they do on contrariety is a fascinating one, and one w ell worth 
telling. In this paper we tell the first part o f the story, Plato’s.
1 Although “contraries” is a standard translation o f ενα ντία  in Aristotle, “opposites” is often used 
as a translation in Plato. There is something to be said for this practice: Plato and Aristotle have 
different ideas about έναντίω σις. However, in the belief that it is a single thing they have different 
ideas about, we use “contraries” for both. Where required, we will use the terms “Platonic contrar­
ies” and “Aristotelian contraries” to distinguish between them.
2 See also Metaphysics X .4, 1055M 6-17; De Cáelo 1.3, 270aI4-17; Generation and Corruption 
1.7, 323b28-324a9.
3 Arguably Phaedrus 262a anticipates the notion o f intermediates in speaking o f a thing’s changing 
from a feature to its contrary “bit by bit” (κατά σμίκρον).
4 Arguably Philehus 12d-13a anticipates Aristotle’s definition o f contrariety as maximum differ­
ence within a genus (Metaphysics X .4, 1055a5-6).
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Before we begin to look at any details o f Plato’s view a consumer’s warning is in order to alert 
the reader to a peculiarity o f our interpretation: we believe the forms do considerably less work in 
Plato’s theorizing about contrariety and change than the literature might suggest. The best way to 
illustrate the idiosyncrasy o f our reading is to contrast it with a more familiar picture o f the role o f  
the forms in Plato’s explanation o f change.
According to V lastos, Socrates is w ise just in case Socrates participates in the form o f wisdom, 
and in general, for any subject, S, and any feature, F, there is a form, the F itself, such that S has F 
just in case S has a share in the F itself (Vlastos 1981, 270-271). According to the Phaedo theory 
o f explanation (which we w ill consider in more detail below), if  something is F (beautiful, or large, 
or hot, for exam ple), its having a share in the F explains why it is F (Phaedo. lOOd). According to  
V lastos if  we explained, say, the coldness o f a dish o f borsch in this way, the explanation would 
tell that the borsch is cold in virtue o f its ‘satisfying... [a] definition’ whose ‘logical content’ is 
what ‘...marks o ff the Form [the cold itself]...from  all...other form s...’ (V lastos, 92)5 These are 
‘safe but stupid’-hereafter, ‘plain’-explanations (105cl). I f Vlastos is right they are informative in 
roughly the same way as Aristotelian formal cause explanations (V lastos, 91-2; see Physics II.3). 
W e ask why something has such and such a feature. The explanation tells us what it is to have that 
feature. That answers our question once we see that the object has whatever the explanation tells us 
is necessary and Sufficient for possessing the feature in question.2
This paper is concerned with changes consisting in the replacement o f  some feature F by some 
feature G, where F and G are mutually exclusive. I f we cooled some borsch by putting snow in it, 
the borsch’s ceasing to be hot and coming to be cold would be a change o f this kind. According to 
V lastos’s story, one form (the hot itself) would determine what it is-and hence, what is necessary 
and sufficient-for the soup to be hot, and another form (the cold itself) would determine what it is -  
and hence what is necessary and sufficient-for the soup to be cold.
In our example, the snow is an explanation-a ‘more elegant’ ( 105c2)-hereafter, ‘fancy’-a s  
opposed to a plain explanation-of the change in temperature. Such explanations rësemble Aristote­
lian efficient causes (Vlastos, 91-2; see Physics II.3). Vlastos thinks fancy explanations depend for 
their explanatory value upon further facts about the forms. For the snow to cool the soup, it must 
be cold and must make things that contain it cold by virtue o f  a ‘physical law' or a ‘law o f nature’. 
W hat makes the coldness o f and the cooling capacity o f snow a matter o f physical law rather than 
mere, brute fact regularity6 is the obtaining o f what Vlastos calls a ‘relation o f entailment’ between 
the forms o f cold and snow (Vlastos, 105) that guarantees that snow w ill introduce cold into what­
ever we put it in. Presumably the cold that the snow brings to the borsch lowers its temperature 
because o f  some sort o f exclusionary relation between the hot itself and the cold itself.
V lastos’s view  exem plifies the common assumption that the theory o f forms is a major compo­
nent o f Plato’s understanding o f change. But we think the forms are next to irrelevant to features 
that figure in a wide variety o f changes-som e o f which are discussed in the Phaedo itself. To see 
why, suppose the borsch we cooled was hot relative to a knish we wanted to serve it with (Ht for 
short), but not as hot, e.g., as burning charcoal or molten lava. Suppose the snow made it cold rel­
ative to the same knish (C k), but not as cold as frozen water or dry ice. According to the terminol­
ogy we introduce in §iii and §iv below, to possess Hk is to be qualifiedly hot, and to possess Gk is
5 This is not V lastos’s example, but he intends his account o f fancy explanations to be quite gen­
eral, and thus to apply to temperatures.
6 Cp. Demos 1966, 176ff. and 186-7.
to be qualifiedly cold. On our interpretations (developed in the next two sections) even i f  a share in 
the cold itse lf is necessary-for being cool relative to the knish, it is not sufficient. Furthermore, a 
full description o f the nature o f the cold itself would not serve-even if  combined with descriptions 
o f other form s-to provide a specification o f exactly what it is to be Ck. The same holds for Hk.7 
This means not only that the forms cannot be plain explanations for the temperature o f the borsch 
before or after the change, but also, that they cannot ground fancy explanations in the way V lastos 
thought. Suppose an ‘entailment relation’ does hold between the form o f  snow and the cold itself. 
Suppose an exclusion relation holds between the hot itself and the cold itself. Suppose that because 
o f “entailment relations” between the relevant forms, snow must bring shares o f the cold itse lf into 
anything that contains it. Even so, the soup can have a share in the hot itself without being H i, the 
soup can have a share in the cold itself without being Ck, and neither form can show us what it is to 
have either o f  those temperatures. This is enough to render the basic story utterly inapplicable. The 
same holds, we think, for changes involving many different sorts o f  features. But where thé basic 
story doesn’t apply, the forms can have little work to do in explaining change:
A related peculiarity o f our interpretation concerns Plato’s idea that the successful practice o f  
medicine, shoemaking, and every other practical art or craft (τέχνη ) depends upon bringing about 
change in which sizes and other quantities are brought from excess and defect to an ideal or desir­
able magnitude. At Statesman 283d-284b Plato observes that the determination o f the desirable 
magnitudes, the excesses, and the deficiencies presupposes fixed standards against which the rele­
vant quantities can be measured. It has been suggested that the forms are the ‘the absolute stan­
dards’ the craftsman must rely upon for this purpose (Demos 1 9 6 6 ,175ff). W e believe the forms 
are so far from being able to perform this function that Aristotle had no reason even to consider 
them as alternatives to his own views about o f change in quantity, and about changes from excess 
or deficiency to desirable magnitudes or proportions;
111 '
W e begin with the Phaedo version o f the theory o f forms:
I’m going to try to explain to you the kind o f cause I have been concerned with. I 
go back to those oft-mentioned things and proceed from them, laying it down that 
there is something beautiful itself by itself itself (τι κ α λόν αυτό καθ’ αυτό), and 
good, and tall, and all the rest. I f you grant me them and agree that they exist, I 
hope from them to explain cause to you, and to show you in what way the soul is 
im m ortal.... Consider, then, whether you agree with me on what com es next. For 
it seems to me that, if  anything is beautiful other than the beautiful itself αυτό το 
κα λόν), then it is beautiful for no other reason than because (διότι) it shares in 
(μετέχει) that beautiful. And I say this about everything. (100b3-c6)
Thus Socrates begins by positing the existence o f forms corresponding to the features beauty, 
goodness, tallness, and “all the rest.” Then he appeals to these forms in explaining why certain ob­
jects have the features in question. Suppose, for example, that Helen is beautiful. Then according 
to the Phaedo, what makes her beautiful is her sharing in the beautiful itself: she is beautiful pre­
cisely because she “shares in the beautiful itself.” Moreover, her sharing in the beautiful itse lf is 
the only thing that, according to the theory, can make her beautiful: she is beautiful for no other 
reason than that. According to the theory, then, Helen’s sharing in the beautiful itse lf is both nec­
essary and sufficient for her being beautiful.
7 W e assume o f course that there are no such forms as the cold (hot) relative to the knisch itself.
Since Plato seems clearly to say so here,8 it is commonly supposed that he believes that for 
any object and any feature, the object’s sharing in the form corresponding to the feature is both 
necessary and sufficient for the object’s having the feature. There are, however, good reasons for 
thinking that Phaedo 100b-c overstates Plato’s real view, at least in the Phaedo. First, a case can 
be made for the claim  that the Phaedo restricts the scope o f its theory to forms for contrary fea­
tures. Only forms for contraries are mentioned in Socrates’ initial list at 100b6, and no forms for 
features other than contraries are mentioned elsewhere in the dialogue.9 In any event, since we are 
interested here sim ply in contraries, we w ill consider the theory only in its application to contrary 
features, and leave open the question o f its applicability to other features.
More importantly, at least for our purposes in this paper, there is reason to think that the Phae­
do does not in fact accept the claim that sharing in a form is sufficient for having the corresponding 
feature. Consider the discussion o f comparatives 102a-103a. Here what is taken to be in need o f  
explanation is the fact that Simmias is both larger than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo (102M - 
5). A t 1 0 2 c l0 -l 1, Socrates tells us that in such a case-“when he is between the two o f  them” 
(1 0 2 cl l ) - “Simmias has the name o f being both small and large” (ô Σιμμίας επω νυμίαν εχει 
σμικρός τε και είνα ι). W e take it that “having the name o f being small and large” here is peri­
phrastic for “is small and large.” I f so, Socrates is telling us that if  Simmias is larger than Socrates 
and smaller than Phaedo, then Simmias is large and small. In this case, then, Simmias has the fea­
ture largeness in virtue o f being larger than Socrates. And although, as we shall see, mention is 
made o f Sim mias’s sharing in die large itself in the explanation o f his being larger to Socrates, 
other things must be mentioned as well. So in this case, sharing in a form in not sufficient, by itself, 
for having the corresponding feature.10
In cases in which an object’s sharing in a form is sufficient for its having the corresponding 
feature, we w ill say that the object has the feature unqualifiedly, or that it has the feature without 
qualification, or that the feature is predicated unqualifiedly. So, for example, since sharing in 
sickness was sufficient to make Plato sick on the day o f the Phaedo (59b l0 ), he was unqualifiedly 
sick on that day. In other cases, where a more complicated situation-like Sim mias’s being larger
8 And elsewhere: see, e.g., Phaedo 78e, 100e-101a, 103o, Parmenides 130e-13 la; and Republic 
596a6-7. Aristotle attributes the view to Plato at Metaphysics 1.6, 987b3-10.
9 Arguably the forms for unity and duality mentioned at 101c are exceptions to this claim. How­
ever, Plato has np clear conception o f what features are and are not contraries, and he may be 
treating unity and duality as contraries here. Alternatively, they may simply be bad exam ples.
(Parmenides 128e-l30b is happy to treat unity and plurality as contraries.)
10 There is also reason to believe that the Phaedo does not accept the claim  that sharing in a form is 
necessary for having the corresponding feature. Consider fire, for example. Phaedo 103e clearly 
implies that fire is hot, and 105bc says that we can adequately explain why, e.g ., a stove is hot by 
citing the presence in it o f fire. But the Phaedo does not bring the hotness o f fire within the scope 
o f the explanatory pattern o f lOObc; it does not say that fire is hot because it shares in the hot it­
self. (In fact the Phaedo offers no explanation at all o f why fire is hot. Timaeus 61d-62a does, ex­
plaining why fire is hot in terms o f structural features o f fire itself, and not, or not obviously, in 
terms o f sharing.) According to the Phaedo, then, fire is hot, but it does not share in the hot itself. 
The same is true o f the rest o f the Phaedo's fancy explanatory factors. The dialogue assum es that 
three, five, etc., are odd while two, four, etc., are even, that snow is cold, that soul is alive, etc., but 
it does not explain why these things have the features they do, and, in particular, it does not say 
that they have them in virtue o f sharing in forms.
5than Socrates-is required in order for a subject to have a feature, we w ill say that the object has the 
feature qualifiedly or with qualification. Simmias’s being large is an example o f one, but not the 
only, variety o f  qualified predication in Plato. In the next section we w ill look at just enough o f the 
details o f  Phaedo 102c-d to explain how this kind o f qualified predication-being large relative to  
something else-differs on Plato’s account from being unqualifiedly large. After that, we w ill briefly 
describe some other varieties o f qualified predication in Plato.
iv
Plato explains what makes Simmias larger than Socrates in two different ways whose connec­
tion with one another, and with the earlier discussion o f sharing in forms, is unfortunately not ob­
vious. According to the first explanation,
[Simmias] surpasses Socrates ... because Socrates has smallness relative to (πρός) 
his [Simmias’s] largeness.11
According to the second explanation, when Simmias is compared to Phaedo, who is larger, and 
Socrates, who is smaller than he,
Simmias has the name o f being small and large when he is between the two o f  
them: submitting his smallness for the largeness o f the one [Phaedo] to surpass, 
and presenting his largeness to the other [Socrates] as something surpassing his 
sm allness.12
These two explanations raise a number o f questions that Plato does not answer.13 Plato does 
not tell us how Sim mias’s largeness is related to his sharing in the large itself; we assume that it is 
a feature he has, in part, because he shares in the large itself. Both explanations use the language 
o f “surpassing,” the first in stating the fact to be explained, the second in explaining the fact; we 
assume that “[Simmias] surpasses Socrates” is a stylistic variant o f “[Simmias] is larger than Soc­
rates” in the first explanation.14 The second explanation has it that the fact in need o f explanation 
is Sim mias’s having the name o f being large. As before, we assume that “having the name o f being 
large” is periphrastic for “being large”; we also assume that “being large” here is elliptical for 
“being large relative to Socrates.”
Even on these assumptions, the two explanations differ both in how they describe the fact to be 
explained and in how they explain that fact. The first has Simmias’s being larger than Socrates as 
the feet to be explained, the second has Simmias’s being large relative to Socrates as the fact to be 
explained.15 More importantly, the first description depicts Socrates’ smallness as something he 
has relative to someone else’s largeness, while the second may depict it as something that he has
11 Σωκράτους ΰπερέχειν...δτι σμικρότητα έχει ô Σωκράτης προς το εκείνου  μέγεθος. (102c3-4)
12 Ούτως άρα ό Σιμμίας επω νυμίαν έχει σμικρός τε καί μέγας ε ίνα ι, έν  μέσω ων άμφοτέρων, 
του μ έν τω μεγέθει ύπερέχειν την σμικρότητα ΰπέχω ν, τφ δε το μέγεθος τής σμικρότητος τής 
σμικρότητος παρέχω ν ύπερέχον. ( 102c 10-d2)
13 In what follow s we ignore the comparison to Phaedo in the second explanation.
14 The surpassing relation mentioned in the second explanation is a more complicated matter. See 
n. 17 below.
15 In this context there may be no significant difference between the two ways o f describing the 
fact. But in general “X is more F than Y ” and “X is F relative to Y ” w ill not be stylistic variants o f  
one another.
6independently o f any comparison with what anyone else has and that may be compared to what 
others have. These two explanations o f why Simmias is larger than Socrates16 are hard sayings 
whose interpretation is beset with difficulties we will not deal with in this paper.17 For our pur­
poses, it is enough to note that on either explanation, Simmias’s sharing in the large itse lf in not, by 
itself, sufficient for his being large. In addition, Socrates must share in the small itself, and Socra­
tes’ sm allness must be appropriately related to Simmias’s largeness.
According to the Phaedo, then, an object may be large in either o f two ways. I f  a thing is large 
sim ply because it shares in the large itself, we say (following the conventions introduced in the 
previous section) that it is unqualifiedly large. If it is large because it is larger than something else, 
or large relative to something else, we say that it is qualifiedly large-qualified by a relation to or a 
comparison with something else. Although many features (e.g., beauty, hotness, and heaviness) 
admit o f  comparison, it not clear whether or to what extent Plato intends us to generalize from the 
cases o f largeness and smallness that we just considered. Suppose, though, that we have a feature 
to which the Phaedo account applies. The conditions for having the feature unqualifiedly and hav­
ing it relative to something else are different enough to allow one and the same individual to have 
the feature relative to with something else but to lack the feature unqualifiedly. Purple is lighter 
than indigo, for example, but both colors are dark. Although Claremont is cooler in the summer 
than Death V alley, it still gets pretty hot. For this reason, we take it that features that are predi­
cated without qualification are different from features whose predication is qualified-not just for 
features predicated in comparison, but for all varieties o f qualified predication.
16 Similar accounts can be given for Socrates’ being smaller than Simmias, Phaedo’s being larger 
than Simmias, and Simmias’s being smaller than Phaedo. But we are indebted to Vanessa DeHar- 
ven for pointing out that i f  Plato were to give exactly the same explanation, e.g ., for Sim mias’s 
being larger than Socrates that he gives for Socrates’ being smaller than Simmias, he would violate 
one o f  his own conditions for adequate explanations. At Phaedo lO lab, Socrates rejects such ex­
planations as “Thelonius is larger than Bud, and Bud is smaller than Thelonius, by a head” be­
cause they appeal to the same thing in the explanation o f contrary features. To avoid explaining 
being smaller and being larger by appeal to the same thing, Plato should say, e.g., that while the 
relation between the members o f the ordered pair consisting o f Socrates’ sm allness and Sim mias’s 
largeness explains why Socrates is smaller than Simmias, what explains why Simmias is larger 
than Socrates is be a relation between members o f a different ordered pair-consisting o f Sim m ias’s 
largeness and Socrates’ sm allness-or a different relation between members o f the same ordered 
pair.
17 For exam ple, it is far from obvious what the formal properties o f the “surpassing” relation men­
tioned in the second explanation would be, let alone which (if  any) relation we are familiar with it 
might correspond to. Moreover, whatever surpassing turns out to be, the following would seem to  
be an obvious difficulty with the second explanation, at least as stated. Consider the smallness 
Simmias has in virtue o f being smaller than Phaedo and the largeness he has in virtue o f being 
larger than Socrates. W e know that Simmias’s largeness surpasses Socrates’ sm allness. Does it 
surpass his own smallness as well? I f it does, then it would seem that he is both larger and smaller 
than him self. A s for the first explanation: it is not clear what it is to say that Socrates’ smallness is 
“something he has relative to the largeness o f someone else,” let alone whether this involves the 
surpassing relation mentioned in the second explanation. Finally, it is hard to say whether the two 
explanations tell two different stories or the same story in two different ways.
VIn addition to the predications discussed in the previous section, which involve Individual Com­
parison, there are several other kinds o f qualified predication in Plato’s writings. Qualified predi­
cation may also involve:
Sortal Comparison. According to the Hippias Major, the most beautiful ape is ugly relative 
to human beings, the m ost beautiful pot is ugly relative to maidens, and the m ost beautiful maiden 
is ugly relative to the gods (289b). Apes, pots, human beings, and maidens are accordingly “no 
more beautiful than ugly” (289c).18 W e are familiar with many examples involving this sort o f  
qualification. Someone can be large for a jockey, small for a football player; fast for a football 
player, slow  for a sprinter; and soon .
Here we have a variety o f qualified predication in which something is said to have a feature 
(e.g., beauty) relative to one kind o f thing (e g ., maidens), and the contrary feature (ugliness) rela­
tive to things o f another kind (e.g., gods). The difference between these qualified predications and 
predications involving comparatives is clear from the fact that if  Socrates is five feet tall and The­
lonius is an inch taller, Thelonius is tall relative to Socrates but short for a human being. Similarly, 
even i f  Claremont is large relative to La Verne, it is not large for a city in Southern California.19
Earlier in the Hippias Major it is affirmed that just people are just by justice (2 8 7 cl-2 ), that 
w ise people are w ise by wisdom (c5), that good things are good by the good (c4-5), and that beau­
tiful things are beautiful by the beautiful (c8-d l), in language close to that o f the Phaedo.20 So the 
Hippias Major, like the Phaedo, allows for the possibility that things can have features unquali­
fiedly.
Pure Relation. Republic 479b3-4 asks, “And again, do the many doubles appear any the less 
halves than doubles?” Apparently the idea is a group (e.g., six dice) may be called double in rela­
tion to one group (e.g., three dice) and half va relation to another group (e.g., twelve dice).21 A l­
though there are obvious similarities between this case and the qualified predication o f  largeness 
and sm allness,22 the predication o f double and half involve no comparatives: although the group o f  
six  is half in relation to the group o f twelve, it is not more half, and although it is double in relation 
to the group o f three, it is not more double.
Respect. An object can enjoy a feature in one respect and the contrary feature in another re­
spect. At Republic 436c-d, for example, Socrates says that we should describe a spinning top as at 
rest with respect to its axis but in motion with respect o f its circumference (436d-e). And in the 
Symposium a man can be beautiful with respect to either or both o f two parts o f himself: his body 
and his soul (21 Ob-c).
18 Regrettably Socrates does not raise the question whether there are beings relative to whom even 
the gods are ugly or-to put the issue sharply-whether there are limits to the series (presumably a 
partial ordering) his examples imply.
19 A  useful discussion o f individual and sortal comparison may be found in W allace 1972.
20N ote in particular 100e2-3: τω καλφ τά καλά καλά.
21 See also Theaetetus 154cff.
22 Indeed, Republic 470b6-7 goes on to ask a question about largeness and smallness analogous to  
b3-4’s question about double and half.
8Perceiving Subject. According to the theory o f vision o f the Timaeus and the “Heraclitean” 
theory o f  vision o f  the Theaetetus, what is white for one perceiver can be black for another. And 
what is beautiful for one perceiver or from one point o f view , or under one set o f circumstances can 
be ugly for (from, under) another.23
vi
In dealing with the Phaedo, it is important to bear in mind that its limited agenda. Plato’s 
principal focus is on the issue o f the immortality o f the soul, and although Socrates claim s that to 
allay the worries o f Simmias and Cebes on this point requires a “complete investigation” o f the 
causes o f coming to be and ceasing to be (95e8-96al), many issues arise that, because they do not 
directly affect the main point at issue, go unaddressed. So, for example, as we have seen, the 
Phaedo is not clear on the range o f features for which there are corresponding forms. It is also si­
lent on the question o f the relation between the two modes o f explanation (plain and fancy) it of­
fers, and on the question o f why some features (e.g., largeness and sm allness) apparently lack 
fancy explanations. Other unanswered questions have to do with the Phaedo's sketchy treatment o f  
qualified and unqualified predication; we take up some o f these in the next few  sections.
vii
Plato’s acceptance o f the varieties o f qualified predication described in §v above introduces 
com plications in understanding his claim that contraries come to be out o f contraries.
Some Platonic contraries-e.g., life and death, odd and even-are mutually exclusive: no subject 
can exhibit both at the same time. Since no subject can exhibit both members o f a pair o f exclusive 
contraries at one and the same time, it follows that no subject can have one such contrary at one 
time and the other at a latter time without changing during the interval. For example, the number o f  
members in a group cannot be even at one time and odd at the next, unless the membership in­
creases or decreases in size. But many Platonic contraries are not exclusive in this way. Simmias is 
large relative to Socrates, and at the same time small relative to Phaedo; a maiden is beautiful rela­
tive to monkeys, and at the same time ugly relative to gods; a spinning top is in motion with respect
23 See Republic 479affi, where anything that’s F will also appear G, and Hippias Major, where 
participation in the F itself makes something appear to be F (289d e) or to become F when put next 
to something else(289a-b). Someone may object, e.g., that to be what we are calling beautiful by 
Perceiving Subject is not to be beautiful at all, but simply to appear to be beautiful. This seems to 
be Plato’s view  at Sophist 235e-236a. Here, a sculpture produces a work that is so large that the 
lower parts w ill seem larger than they really are, and the upper parts, smaller than they really are 
from a normal viewing position. If the sculptor used ‘the true proportions o f beautiful things’, the 
statue would look ugly, and so he uses ‘proportions that are not but w ill seem to be beautiful,’ (ού  
τάς οΰσας συμμετρίας ά λλα  τάς δοξούσας ε ίν α ι καλάς). But at Republic 479b, things that 
‘appear’ to be beautiful w ill also ‘appear’ to be ugly, just as things that ‘appear’ to be doubles w ill 
also ‘appear’ to be halves-and similarly for great and small, light and heavy, etc. The verb 
φ αίνομαι, here translated in the language o f appearance, is sometimes used to talk about how  
things appear as opposed to how they really are. But it is sometimes used in connection with what 
is evidently the case. The example o f doubles and halves indicates that in our passage Plato uses 
‘appears’ in the second o f these senses: 6 really is double relative to 3, and really is half relative to 
12. Indeed, the whole point o f his bringing in the language o f appearance here is to introduce a 
realm o f ‘what is and is not’(477a6).
9to its circumference, and at the same time at rest with respect to its axis.24 This illustrates Plato’s 
willingness to admit the possibility o f compresence for contraries as well as for non-contrary fea­
tures that anyone would expect subjects to be able to have at the same time. W henever contraries 
can be predicated o f one and the same subject at one and the same time, it is possible for something 
can have one o f the contraries at one time and the other at a later time, without changing in the in­
terval. Simmias w ill be large if  we compare him to Socrates in the morning and small i f  we com­
pare him to Phaedo in the afternoon, but his size does not change during the day. This raises ques­
tions about how to understand Plato’s claim that contraries-as he conceives o f them -com e to be 
out o f contraries, and about how much this claim can help us in understanding change and coming 
to be.
Republic IV includes a claim about incompatibility for contraries that seems to offer some 
help:
1. Exclusion: Nothing can either be in contrary states or do or suffer contraries at the 
same time, in the same respect, and in relation to the same thing. (Republic 436b8-cl ; 
see also 436e8-437a2 and 439b5).
This principle tells us that whenever contraries are predicated, they must be predicated either o f  
different subjects, or o f the same subject at different times, in different respects, or in relation to  
different things.25 For example, a man who is standing still and moving his arm requires a division  
in the subject: part o f him is at rest, part in motion (436c). The number o f Musketeers is odd and 
even: odd prior to D ’Artagnan’s joining them, even afterwards. A  top can be at rest and in motion 
at the same time: at rest in respect o f its circumference, in motion in respect o f its axis (436d). And 
Sifflmiäs is both small and large: large in relation to Socrates, small in relation to Phaedo.
As far as we know Plato nowhere explicitly sets out conditions that distinguish contraries from 
non-contrary features, but Exclusion might be used for this purpose. W e see no reason why Plato 
should not accept the following as a partial characterization o f contrariety:
2. Contrariety: Two features are contraries just in case no single subject can be or do or 
suffer both features G at the same time, in the same respect, and in relation to the same 
thing.26
This condition does partially characterize contrariety: it counts genuine contraries as contraries.
But it seems inadequate in at least two respects. First, since no single subject can be both hot and 
warm at the same time, in the same respect, and in relation to the sàme thing, hotness and warmth 
count as contraries. This seems odd both in counting'hotness and warmth as contraries27 and in al-
24 These examples all involve qualified predication. Whether compresence is possible for some 
cases o f unqualified predication is a question oh which the Phaedo is silent. As we shall see, the 
Republic implies a negative answer.
25 Thus it tells us that the predication o f contraries is always qualified predication, thus answering 
the question that the Phaedo left open.
26 N otice that this does not give us a condition for contrary forms. To get such a condition from  
Contrariety, we would have to add conditions that appeal to the role o f those forms in the qualified 
and unqualified predication o f the features involved.
27 Republic 43%bc, however, gives some reason to think that Plato might swállow it. There he sug­
gests that the greater is the contrary o f the lesser, and the much greater is the contrary o f the much
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lowing that hotness has more than one contrary.28 Second, since no act can be both unjust and 
virtuous, virtue and injustice count as contraries. This seems odd, too: injustice is a species o f vice, 
the contrary o f virtue, and virtue is the genus o f justice, the contrary o f injustice.29 Furthermore, it 
is arguable that dead people cannot be either qualifiedly or unqualifiedly ill or w ell, honest or dis­
honest, graceful or clumsy, friendly or unfriendly, etc. If this iS so, dead and honest (dishonest, 
graceful, etc.) would be contraries according to (2). This is a bad result if  contrariety must be re­
lied on for system atic characterizations o f change. Going from life to death should qualify as a 
change, but going from life to lack o f illness, honesty, etc. should not.
via
W orse still, Plato’s acceptance o f qualified predications o f contraries threatens to make change 
incoherent, as he him self seems to have realized. At Theaetetus 155a-d, Socrates introduces three 
general principles governing change:
3. I f a thing has a feature (e.g., a certain size or number) at t2 that it lacked at ti, then 
between ti and t2 it came to have that featiire.(155b)
4. If a thing remains thé same with respect to a feature (e.g., if  it remains the same in size 
or number) between ti and t2, then it does not come to have another, incompatible fea­
ture (e.g., it does not come to be greater or less in size or number) at t2 than it was at 
t,. (155a)
5. I f  nothing is done or happens to a thing (e.g., if  nothing is added to or subtracted from 
it) between ti and t2, then it remains the same (e.g., in size or number) between ti and 
t2. (155b)
These claim s seem to be obvious truths about change generally or quantitative change in par­
ticular. According to 155b-c, however, when applied to everyday occurrences, the claim s seem to 
imply a contradiction. Suppose that in January Socrates is large relative to Theaetetus, and that 
Socrates neither gains nor loses any o f his substance during the course o f the year, but that Theae­
tetus grows so much that by December Socrates is smáll relative to Theaetetus^ Then Socrates has 
a feature in December that he lacked in January: smallness relative to Theaetetus. By (3), he must 
have come to have that feature between January and December. But by (4) and (5) he didn’t. Since 
he neither gained nor lost any o f his substance during the year, it follows from (5) he remained the 
same. And if  he remained the same during the year, (4) tells us that he could not have come to be 
smaller than Theaetetus between January and December.
Plato presents a similar puzzle for a case involving a group o f six dice: that group is more by 
half relative to a group o f four and less by half relative to a group o f twelve without undergoing a 
change in number (154c). This puzzle is introduced by a general assum ption-a close relative o f (3) 
above-w hose acceptance would generate similar puzzles for heat, color, and other features in addi­
tion to size (154b).
lesser. It is not a large step from this to the view that the much greater is also contrary to the 
greater.
28 Protagoras 332a-333b uses the claim that each contrary has only a single contrary as a premise 
in arguing that wisdom and temperance are a single thing since each is the contrary o f folly.
29 Aristotle’s characterization o f contrariety as maximum difference within a genus (Metaphysics 
X .4, 1055a5-6) improves on Contrariety in not being subject to either o f these criticism s.
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Puzzles o f  this sort show that for some contraries that belong to things relative to  something 
else, a subject that has one o f the contraries at one time can have the other at another time, without 
having changed. Plato can appeal to Contrariety to avoid this result in some cases. For exam ple, in 
the dice puzzle, the group o f six dice is larger by half relative to one group and smaller by half rel­
ative to another, and according to Contrariety these two features are not contraries. But we can 
easily m odify Plato?s example to provide a case in which the group o f six  dice passes from con­
trary to contrary without changing. Suppose we compare the group o f six  to a group that increases 
in size from four members to twelve. Then the group o f six is first larger by half and then smaller 
by half relative to one and the same group. According to Contrariety, being larger by half and be­
ing smaller by half relative to one and the same group are contraries. But even though these fea­
tures count as contraries, the group o f six, which was earlier larger by half than the second group, 
can be smaller by half later, without undergoing any change. And Contrariety does not help with 
the original growing boy puzzle at all: even though it was Theaetetus and not Socrates who 
changed, being large relative to Theaetetus and being small relative to Theaetetus qualify as con­
traries according to Contrariety, because Socrates cannot be both small and large relative to 
Theaetetus at one and the same time. Analogous cases can be constructed for relative and for com­
parative predications involving temperature, color, and other features.
ix
Problems o f a different sort arise in connection with changes (e.g., from health to sickness) 
involving the unqualified possessions o f contrary features. In the first place, the Phaedo is not 
clear on the question o f the conditions under which features are predicated unqualifiedly. In the 
case o f some o f the features the Phaedo discusses, answers seem clear enough. A ll predications o f 
oddness and evenness are unqualified, and a collection is even or odd unqualifiedly according as 
the number o f its members is or is not divisible by two. Similarly, creatures that meet the definition 
o f health w ill count as unqualifiedly healthy. In other cases, certain guesses seem more or less rea­
sonable. Since, as we believe, the hotness o f pure fire is as hot as it gets in Plato’s cosm os, it seems 
reasonable for him to say, for example, that things within a certain range o f the heat o f pure fire 
count as unqualifiedly hot. In many cases, however, answers are increasingly problematic: e.g ., is 
anything unqualifiedly beautiful, or unqualifiedly large or small, apart from the forms correspond­
ing to these features?
Problems remain even if  we assume that such questions have answers. To illustrate this, con­
sider the features largeness and smallness. Recall that unqualified smallness is a feature Simmias 
has just in virtue o f sharing in the form for smallness, quite apart from any comparison or relation 
to Socrates, to men in general; etc. Plato says contraries come to be out contraries (Phaedo 70e4- 
71alO ). W e suppose that if  unqualified largeness and unqualified smallness are contraries, and if  
Simmias was unqualifiedly small at one time and unqualifiedly large at another, it should follow  
from an adequate account o f contrariety that Simmias changed during the interval. But on the 
plainest reading o f the text o f Phaedo 102c 10-d2, it would seem that this is false. At 102el0-d2, 
Simmias seems to have the largeness that makes him larger than Socrates and the smallness that 
makes him smaller than Phaedo independently o f any comparisons to Socrates and Phaedo. Thus 
he seems to be both unqualifiedly large and unqualifiedly small at the same time. So if  instead we 
compared him to Phaedo in the morning and to Socrates in the evening, he would pass from being 
unqualifiedly small in the morning to being unqualifiedly small in the evening, without having 
changed in between. It seems plausible to us, and we have no doubt that it seemed plausible to 
Plato, that nothing can be unqualifiedly large and small at the same time. And for some features 
like sickness and health, it seems not just plausible but obvious. But recognizing the plausibility o f
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such intuitions and accounting for their correctness are by no means the same thing; it is the latter 
that gives Plato trouble.
If Plato has anything definitive to say about the incompatibility o f unqualified contraries, he 
says it at Republic 436b-d, which may be read as suggesting an extension o f Exclusion (1) to cover 
them. Having said that nothing can do or suffer contraries at the same time, in the same respect, 
and in relation to the same thing, he says that if  we ever find contraries being done or suffered at 
the same time we can be sure that the contraries belong to different item s.30 But if  this passage 
does apply the principle o f exclusion to unqualified contraries, all it tells us is that there are pairs 
o f features such that no single subject can possess both members o f any one o f those pairs un­
qualifiedly at one and the same time. Presumably wellness and illness (and largeness and sm all­
ness) are pairs o f this kind, while wellness and smallness (and illness and largeness) are not. If the 
relevant group were defined in such a way that unqualified largeness and smallness belong, and 
therefore that they fall under Exclusion, then Plato could say that being small at one time and large 
at another is sufficient for change. But Plato has no such account. Although it seems obvious that 
nothing can be unqualifiedly large and small (or well and ill) at the same time, Plato has no princi­
pled account o f why Exclusion should apply to these. On the other hand, if  Plato does not intend 
Exclusion to apply to the unqualified possession o f contraries, he has no other no way o f ruling out 
the possibility that Simmias can be unqualifiedly large and small at the same time and thus that 
Simmias could be small at one time and large at another without undergoing a change in size.
Something like this can be said o f qualified contrariety as well. Plato certainly does not provide 
any explicit account o f why any given features should or should not fall under Contrariety. But his 
theory seems to have more resources here than it does for the ease o f unqualified contraries.31 That 
is because in at least some cases an appeal to the factors involved in the qualified possession o f two 
features may provide a little help in understanding why Exclusion should apply to them. For ex­
ample, it should be possible to explain why a given horse could not both ugly and beautiful with 
regard to the standards o f beauty and ugliness to horses. And it might be possible for Plato to ex­
plain why Socrates could not be both large and small relative to Simmias.
X
Plato’s problems in the Phaedo and the Theaetetus are not problems for us. To explain why 
Simmias is larger than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo, we introduce numerical measures o f 
quantities: Simmias is larger than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo because his height is greater 
than Socrates’ height and less than Phaedo’s. So an obvious question to ask is why Plato didn’t do 
what we would do in dealing with the issues raised in such passages as the Phaedo ’s tortured dis­
cussions o f qualified largeness, and the Theaetetus ’ puzzles o f the dice and the growing boy? Why 
didn’t he use numerical measures to analyze the fact that Simmias is smaller than Phaedo and taller 
than Socrates? W hy did he worry about how even though Socrates did not change in size, he was at 
one tim e larger than Theaetetus and at another time larger without giving numerical measures o f 
their height at the relevant times? Why did he attach so much importance to the fact that one group
30 At 4 3 6 b 8 -d  (ώστε α ν που έυρίσκωμεν έν  αύτοις ταυτα γιγνόμ ενα , εΐσόμεθα οτι ού  ταύτον 
η ν ά λλα  πλείώ ), ταυτα refers to parts o f the soul mentioned earlier. But the doings and sufferings 
to which Plato refers are not limited to states o f  the soul; the principle is applied immediately to the 
motion and rest o f a human body (436c) and then to the motion and rest o f a top (436d).
31 This difference in resources may be due to the fact that for reasons sketched in thé next section 
Plato had good reason to pay more attention to qualified than to unqualified contrariety.
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o f dice is ¡smaller by half than a second group and larger by half than a third when he could have 
counted the dice in each group and compared the numbers?
It is easy to answer such questions unsympathetically. One unsympathetic answer is that 
Plato’s apparent lack o f interest in numerical measures in dealing with quantitative features like 
largeness and sm allness betrays a remarkably inadequate and primitive notion o f measurement. 
Another unsympathetic answer is that Plato was merely kicking up sand by presenting spurious 
puzzles he could easily have avoided. We certainly agree that ancient Greek measurement theory 
and practice was less sophisticated than our own. W e also agree that Plato knew that some o f  these 
puzzles can be used to support sophistical positions.32 But we also think that features like lar­
geness raise genumely important issues that must be resolved if  numerical measures o f length, tem­
perature, weight, volume and other quantities are to be theoretically and practically useful.
in the Statesman, Plato says the importance o f the art o f  measurement derives from its appli­
cation to practical crafts like weaving and Clothes making (<Statesman 284a-b).33 Plato typically 
describes the successful practice o f any practical craft as depending upon the avoidance or correc­
tion o f excesses and deficiencies o f various item s. Thus the musician must avoid tightening the 
strings o f his lyre too tightly and too loosely. The physician must keep his patient from being hotter 
or colder than he should be. Like an athletic trainer, he must know whether the improvement o f one 
man’s condition requires him to eat more, less, or the same amount o f food than another.34 D isas­
ter ensues i f  the craftsman disregards
due measure (το μέτρειον) by [applying] greater power to things that áre too small 
[for it]-[too  much] sail to a boat, [too much] food to a body, and [too many] prin­
ciples (το μέτρειον) to a soul35 ... {Laws III, 691cl-3 )
If sufficiency, excess, and deficiency are crucial to the practice o f the crafts, the usefulness o f  
a measurement system w ill depend upon the help it provides in determining whether a given quan­
tity is too much, too little, or exactly just enough o f what is required for the purpose at hand. And 
no measuring system can help with this unless we can find out what is enough, and what is too  
much or too little for each given purpose. Thus Plato says the crafts, including statesmanship, de­
pend upon the possibility o f establishing standards (μέτρια) relative to which quantities can be 
called excessive or deficient (Statesman 284a-c). In order to determine whether, e.g ., a given 
amount o f food is sufficient for the physician’s purposes* it w ill not do to find out whether it is 
greater (smaller) than just any smaller (greater) amount.
[T]he more and the less are to be measured relative (πρός) not only to one another, 
but also to the attainment o f a due measure (προς την του μέτριου γένεσ ιν).
(Statesman 2 8 4 b l-c l)
The same holds, we suppose, for large and small amounts; a large amount o f  food would be large 
riot just relative to any small amount . For the purposes o f the physician, it would be large relative 
to the amount required to establish or restore the required bodily state. This makes it natural for
32 He says as much at Theaetetus 154c.
33 In what follow s we ignore a number o f important complications.
34 See, e.g .. Republic 349a.
35 W e suppose that with the last phrase Plato has in mind, e g., presenting a student with more 
principles o f grammar than he can deal with.
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Plato to think an adequate theory o f the crafts36 must explain what is to be larger and smaller, 
more and less, half, double, equal, etc., and what it is to be to be qualifiedly large, small, etc. But it 
must also account for the standard measures relative to which these comparatives and qualified 
predications o f quantity can be used to characterize the excesses and defects that the various crafts 
must avoid, and the sufficient amounts they aim for.
It seems clear that the introduction o f a system o f numerical measures without an account o f  
the due measures and o f what it is to be large and small, etc,, relative to them would have little to  
offer in answer to Plato’s concerns about quantities in connection with the crafts. For exam ple, it 
would not help a doctor to know how to measure temperature in degrees without knowing how the 
resulting numbers could be used to establish whether the patient’s heat is medically deficient or 
excessive.
It is worth mentioning that a related point holds for theoretical crafts, though we don’t know  
whether or in what form Plato would have subscribed to it. The point is nicely illustrated by an 
observation o f the nineteenth century physicist, P. G. T ait Tait says that because “there is no such 
thing as absolute size” there is no reason why an arbitrarily small object should not be “astound- 
ingly com plex in its structure.”
However far we go [in examining smaller and small bits o f matter] there w ill ap­
pear before us something ftirther to be assailed. The small separate particles o f a 
gas are each, no doubt less complex in structure than the whole visible universe, 
but the comparison is a comparison o f two infinities. 37
A  moral to be drawn from this is that the importance o f numerical measurements does not re­
quire the “absolute” quantities whose existence Tait denies. In Tait’s example, measurements can 
be o f  interest to a theoretician if  they indicate whether an object has a size appropriate to the inves­
tigation o f structure o f a certain kind or at a certain level o f complexity. More generally, just as 
practical crafts require measurements o f excess and defect relative to a fixed standard, theoretical 
crafts require measurements o f quantity in terms o f units that are appropriate to the task o f the 
theoretician.38
I f w e are right about the importance o f comparative and qualified quantities to Plato’s concep­
tion o f  measure, we can see not only why he should have been concerned with problems like that o f  
the growing boy, but also why he is not interested in a solution to the problem along more modem  
lines.
A ristotle’s discussions o f contrariety-in Metaphysics Iota, for exam ple-can be plausibly be 
read as a response to Plato’s discussion o f qualified predications. Aristotelian contraries are the 
fixed standards needed to ground descriptions and measurements o f features with respect to which 
things change. Among these are the standards Plato had said the practical craftsman would need to 
measure excesses, deficiencies, and quantities involved in their correction (see the previous sec­
tion). But Aristotle’s account o f contrariety also applies to standards that natural philosophers and
36 In light o f Plato’s views on the centrality o f crafts in human life, an adequate theory o f the crafts 
would articulate what is foundational to the proper conduct o f all practical affairs.
37From Tait 1876. The passage is quoted and usefully discussed in Bellone 1980, 40ff.
38 W e believe that a related consideration underlies the cryptic remarks on quantity at Philebus 
16d-18d and 22c-25b. Reasons o f space prevent us from pursuing the point here.
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theoreticians need to describe and measure change. We think Aristotle’s goal was to develop a 
foundational account o f measurement that would apply to theoretical as well as practical crafts. 
W e have no space in this paper to argue for this story, or to develop any o f  its details. But we w ill 
conclude with two brief suggestions about (what we take to be) Aristotle’s response to some o f the 
problems Plato set for him.
XII
First o f  all, consider the means at Aristotle’s disposal for dealing with the growing boy and 
dice puzzles from thë Theaetêtus (sée §viii above). According to Categories 7, 8a31 ff.,
6. A feature, F, is a relative (πρός τι) feature if  what it is to be F-the being (τό ε ίν α ι) o f  
the feature-consists in its being related in some way to a feature, G, whose being con­
sists in its being related to F.
For exam ple, what it is to be double depends upon what it is to be half, while what it is to b eh a lf 
depends upon what it is to be double. Following Porphyry (In Aristotelis categorías, 125.25-29), 
we take the point o f this to be to distinguish the relative features o f a subject from features it pos­
sesses just in virtue o f what belongs it essentially or accidentally. To illustrate the distinction, re­
call Plato’s groups o f dice. One o f them contained 6 dice. This quantity belongs to it non-relatively, 
just in virtue o f its composition. By contrast, larger (larger bv half) and smaller (sm aller by halft 
are relative features. By itself, a group o f 6 is neither larger nor smaller, larger by half nor smaller 
by half. But it is larger by half than a group o f 4, and smaller by half than a group o f 12. Recall 
Plato’s observation that measurements in terms o f relative greatness and sm allness (προς α λλη λα  
μεγέθους και σμικρότητος και σμικρότητος) are worthless to the practical craftsman because 
what makes something greater is just its relation to what is smaller, while what makes something 
smaller is just its relation to what is greater (Statesman 283d). So characterized, relative greatness 
and sm allness fit (6) above so well that Aristotle’s characterization o f relative features could easily  
serve as a generalization o f Plato’s observation.
Since one thing’s possession o f a relative feature (larger or smaller by half in this case) de­
pends upon the possession by something else o f a correlative feature (smaller or larger by half), 
what has a relative feature can lose it, and what lacks a relative feature can come to have it by 
virtue o f facts about other things. To bring it about that our group o f dice is no longer larger by 
half, we need only add some dice to the group we were comparing it to, or compare it to another, 
larger group. If w e’d like our group to become larger all we have to do is subtract dice from the 
group o f 12, or compare it to another, smaller group. Thus, as Poiphyry observed, relative features 
“come into and out o f being without their subjects being affected” (Porphyry, 125.29). This is what 
we take Aristotle to mean when he says there is no change with regard to relatives (Physics V .2, 
225M 1).
This suggests a treatment o f the puzzles o f the growing boy and the dice. Aristotle can grant 
(3) (above) that for any feature, F, if  something lacks F at one time and has F at a later tim e, it 
must have come to have F. He can also grant (4) that for any incompatible features, F and G, any­
thing that has F continuously from one time to the next cannot have or come to have G during that 
span o f time. But he can reject (5), according to which a subject that has a feature o f  any kind 
whatsoever, cannot cease to have that feature unless something is done to it or happens to it. A l­
though (5) holds, e.g., for non-relative features, and to relatives possessed only by virtue o f com­
parison to a fixed standards, a subject can lose a feature without undergoing any genuine change as 
long as that feature falls under (6) above (Physics V .2, 225bl 1-13). Therefore, contrary to (5), 
nothing needs to be done, and nothing needs to happen to a thing to make it lose or gain a relative
lé
feature o f this sort. And so it is with the features aquired by the dice and by Socrates in the grow­
ing boy example. They are features that fäll within the scope o f (6), not (5 ) .39
xiii
Our second and final suggestion has to do with features to which (5) applies. I f all things come 
to be out of, and pass away into, contraries, there must be contraries in all o f the categories with 
regard to whose properties things can change, ignoring substantial change, these categories include 
Quantity, Quality, and Place (e,g„ Physics V .2, 226á24ff. ζαά Metaphysics XIV. 1, 1088a31). The 
issues w e are going to consider have to do with changes in quantity. Please note that what we have 
to say about them is by no means a complete account o f Aristotle’s treatment o f  quantitative con­
traries, let alone o f the contraries involved in any o f the other categories with respect to which 
things change.
A ristotle’s general strategy for regimenting accounts o f change requires the scientist to identify 
contraries he can use to locate the features with respect to which the subject o f his investigation 
changes, and to orient his treatment o f the change he investigates. For any given change, Aristotle 
supposes there should be a unique pair o f contraries. Its members will be mutually exclusive fea­
tures such that the change under investigation w ill consist o f (a) the replacement o f  one contrary by 
the other, or (b) the replacement o f one o f the contraries by an intermediate falling somewhere in 
between it and its contrary, or (c) the replacement o f one intermediate by another intermediate or 
(d) the replacement o f an intermediate by a contrary. For example, Aristotle thinks dark and light 
are the contraries involved in changes o f color; red, blue, and all o f the other colors are intermedi­
ates ordered by their relations to them. Accordingly, any color change w ill consist o f (a) a com­
pletely light subject turning completely dark (or vice versa), or (b) a com pletely light (or dark)
39 This anticipates points that would become central to early 20th century discussions o f what Peter 
Geach called ‘Cambridge change’ (Geach 1979, 90-91). In 1903 Russell (1964, 469) defined 
change as
...the difference, in respect o f truth and falsehood, between a proposition con­
cerning an entity and a time T and a proposition concerning the same entity and 
another time T , provided that the two propositions differ only in the fact that T  
occurs in the one where Τ' occurs in the other.
O f course this definition is inadequate; the change in the truth value o f a proposition like ‘Socrates 
is taller than Theaetetus’ requires nothing more than a change in Theaetetus. W e have seen that 
Aristotle is well aware o f this. And it is remarkable that when one thing loses or gains a relative 
feature sim ply because o f facts about what it is compared to, Aristotle says something comes (or 
ceases) to be true, instead o f saying that any genuine (non-incidental) change (μεταβολή) has taken 
place.
... ένδέχεται γάρ θατέρου μεταβάλλοντος άληθεύεσθαι καί μή άληθεύεσθαι 
θάτερον μηδέν μεταβάλλον, ώστε κατά συμβεβηκος ή κ ίνη σ ις αύτω ν. (Physics 
V .2, 225Μ 1-13)
In this passage Aristotle uses the notion o f change in truth value by means o f which Russell tried 




subject turning one o f the intermediate colors, or (c) the replacement one intermediate color by an­
other, or (d) by light or dark.40
This scheme imposes a uniqueness requirement on contraries:
7. I f a feature has a contrary at all, it has no more than one. (Metaphysics X .5, 1055b30, 
1 0 5 6 a ll, 19-20)
One o f A ristotle’s problems with quantitative change is that things can change with respect to 
quantities that don’t seem to satisfy this condition. For example, condition (7) is not satisfied by 
such features as being one or more feet long, weighing one or more pounds, etc. (Categories 6,
5b 1 I ff) . That is because each o f these magnitudes is opposed not to just one, but to an unlimited 
number o f different magnitudes, no one o f which has any better qualifications for being called its 
contrary than any other. Nevertheless, growing a foot and gaining a pound are certainly changes. 
To accommodate them to his general scheme, Aristotle must find a way o f system atically identify­
ing such quantities as contraries or intermediates.
A  second problem arises in connection with quantities things have by virtue comparison, e.g., 
large relative to a m illet seed or to a mountain (Categories 6, 5b l7). Suppose the sizes o f a par­
ticular seed or mountain are fixed. Then things can change with respect to these sizes: if  something 
is large relative to a mountain at one time and small relative to the same mountain at a later time, it 
must have undergone a change in the interim. Like contraries, such quantities are mutuàlly exclu­
sive. Furthermore, they admit o f intermediates.41 And (as required for all contraries mMetaphys- 
ics X .4 and De Interpretatione 7-10) a subject can lack both magnitudes, either because the sub­
ject is something like a soul that is incapable o f having any sort o f spatial magnitude, or because it 
has an intermediate, rather than one o f the contrary magnitudes. But comparatives like these are 
not definite quantities . Things that are large relative to a m illet seed (avocado seeds, watermelons, 
huts and mountains, for example) come in an enormous42 number o f different sizes. This means 
that something whose size changes drastically need not change with respect to such comparative 
quantities: a sapling and the mighty oak it grows into are both large in comparative to  a m illet seed 
and small relative to a mountain. The indefiniteness that makes this possible also distinguishes 
quantities predicated by comparison to some actual object from the due measures Plato said were 
required for the successful pursuit o f the crafts. For example, a nutritionally adequate amount o f  
iron, an amount that is either small or large enough to cause blood abnormalities, and an amount 
that must be added to or subtracted from the diet to restore health w ill all be small relative to some 
objects o f comparison (e.g., the amount o f calcium in an oyster shell) and large relative to others 
(e.g., the amount o f titanium contained in a thin slice o f stewed morel). I f quantitative contraries 
are to serve as or provide a basis for the determination o f due measures,and i f  the magnitude o f  
what.has one o f a pair o f contrary quantities cannot change unless it is replaced by an incompatible 
quantity, contraries must satisfy a definiteness requirement:
40 For some details, see Bogen 1991 and 1992.
41 A t the very least, the size o f a millet seed or a mountain must fall between the sizes o f  things that 
are large relative to it and things that are small relative to it. Intermediates are required by Aristotle 
to distinguish pairs o f relatives that are contraries (according to Categories 6b 15, some are and 
some are not) from pairs o f relatives that are not (Metaphysics X .4, 1057a37 ft).
42 Only Aristotle’s belief in a finite universe prevents the number from being infinitely large.
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8. For any pair o f contrary magnitudes, nothing that has either magnitude can be larger 
or smaller than anything else With the same magnitude.43
A ristotle’s second problem is to secure definiteness.
A s we understand it, the leading idea o f Aristotle’s strategy for explaining how quantities can 
be opposed in such a way as to satisfy both (7) and (8) is that an ideal classification scheme would 
sort things into kinds such that-where K is one o f these kinds-as large and as small as is possible 
for a K (or for a normal, or for a fully developed K, etc.) would be unique, definite magnitudes in 
relation to which intermediate sizes could be defined. Aristotle finds he must apply this idea in d if­
ferent ways to different sorts o f quantities for different sorts o f things. But here is one illustration 
o f the general strategy.
Increase is a change in quantity that Aristotle characterizes increase as change ‘toward com ­
plete magnitude’ (εις τέλειον μέγεθος). By contrast, decrease is a change away from this complete 
magnitude (226a23-32). It is not clear just what (if anything) this can mean for all cases. But for 
an animal or plant that grows and shrinks (in size, weight, etc.) during the course o f  its life, Aris­
totle’s talk o f moving toward and away from complete magnitudes makes perfectly good sense if  
there is a definite maximum (or perhaps a unique, developmentally ideal) size that normal, healthy, 
mature organisms o f a given kind can attain. These sizes w ill differ from kind to kind; horses can 
grow larger than wombats, and oak trees can grow larger than peonies. The magnitudes o f m axi­
mal and minimal sizes are determined, according to Aristotelian biology, by the natural abilities for 
nutrition and growth possessed by normal organisms o f various kinds. I f for each kind there is also  
minimum size (beyond which no smaller organism o f the kind can survive, or retain its normal 
functioning, or something o f the kind), then there w ill be a maximum and a minimum size such that 
change in size for an organism w ill be increase toward the former, or decrease toward the latter for 
the kind to which the organism belongs.44 W e believe that when Aristotle characterized contrariety 
as
9a. extreme or complete difference (μεγίστη διαφορά ai Metaphysics X .4, 1055a4; 
διαφορά τέλειος at 1055a 16) between
9b. predicates o f the same genus (1055a26flf.)45
9c. that can belong to the same recipient (δεκτικόν) or matter (ΰλη) (1055a29 ff.),46
he was generalizing from this sort o f account.47 For growth or decrease in the size o f an organism, 
the genus (9b) is size, the extremely or completely different predicates (9a) falling under the genus
43 A  similar condition is required for intermediates, and analogous conditions must be required for 
contraries and intermediates in other categories. We need not, and w ill not try to formulate any 
Aristotelian definiteness requirements here. Non-Aristotelian requirements o f definiteness can be 
found in Ellis 1966, or any other standard treatise on measurement.
44 See Bogen 1992, 17fif.
45 This is the way people define contraries according to Aristotle in Categories 6, 6a l7 -18 . (Cp. 
Generation and Corruption 1 .7, 323b29-324al.)
46 For further discussion see Bogen 1991 and 1992.
47 According to Metaphysics X .4, 1055al0-22, both uniqueness (7) and definiteness (8) can be 
secured for any sorts o f contraries for which ‘modes o f com pleteness’ (...το  τελείω ς ούτως ώς ...) 
can be determined. On our reading, for any pair o f contraries (quantitative, qualitative, or spatial)
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o f size are, e.g., maximally large (small) for a stoat. The recipients (9c) o f which these contraries 
are predicated are organisms o f a specified kind. The matters (9c) are their bodies. Change in size 
for a stoat is a process by which the animal’s body comes to be closer to one o f the extremes and 
farther from the other than it was at the beginning o f the process. Once the contraries are fixed, 
numbers o f  convenient units can be assigned to them, and these can be used to characterize inter­
mediates. Suppose that « ounces is the minimum weight for a stoat and that m is the maximum  
weight for tw o numbers, « and m. Neither « nor m has a contrary apart from its being the number 
o f a minimum or maximum magnitude for some kind. But « and m are measures o f  contrary sizes. 
And for any « '>  « and any m'<m,  such that m’> n’, what is « 'a t onetim e and m 'at another w ill 
have changed in size, increasing toward or decreasing away from the complete weight for a stoat. 
Growing from one o f the « 'to  one o f the /«'.w ill be a change because the subject moves from one 
position relative to a complete magnitude to another-and similarly for shrinking from one o f the m' 
to one o f the «'. Growing larger will be a change because to grow larger w ill be to grow from one 
o f the « ' to one o f the m '.
To see how this applies to due measures, imagine that you are an ancient Greek physical 
trainer who prescribes foods and exercises to maintain the fitness o f a runner. You should know the 
maximal and minimal weights for normal human beings. You should know what intermediate 
weight range is healthy for humans, and appropriate for athletes, like the one you are training. This 
knowledge w ill allow you to decide whether she weighs too much or too little. I f you also know 
how much pasta is required to maintain weight in the proper range, you w ill be able to find out 
whether her diet includes too much or too little, and if  necessary, how her pasta intake should be 
changed to remedy an excess or defect in weight.
At Categories 5b24fF, Aristotle observes that what counts as many people in a village would 
not qualify as many people in Athens, and that what counts as many people in a house is less than 
what counts as many people in a theater. This illustrates an important difference between com­
parative measures o f quantity (like small relative to a mountain) and the specifications o f quantity 
by Sortal Comparison that Aristotle uses to explain contrariety and due measure in the examples 
we have just been considering. A group o f people is not many or few relative to the number o f  
people who were actually in the house, the theater, the village, or the city at any particular time. 
Instead, many and few are understood-depending on what is appropriate for the relevant context- 
as many for a house (or theater, or village or city to hold the capacities o f the house, etc.) These 
magnitudes are determined, not by the populations, but by the capacities o f the relevant places. 
A ristotle’s use o f Sortal Comparisons to explain quantitative contraries is analogous to this: magni­
tudes are fixed by appeal to the abilities (e.g., for growth) that are characteristic o f kinds o f indi­
viduals, rather than the magnitudes that have actually been attained by the members o f the kinds.
The idea that natural kinds are distinguished from one another to an important extent by the 
abilities (δυνάμεις) o f their normal members is o f course central to Aristotelian biology. Indeed, if  
what we have been suggesting in this section is correct, an important part o f the work o f an Aristo­
telian biologist (who studies natural differences between members o f different kinds o f  organisms, 
or seeks to develop an adequate taxonomy o f natural kinds) would be relevant to the identification 
o f quantitative contraries. W e believe an examination o f Aristotle’s treatments o f other contraries 
(e.g., o f  contrary colors, tastes, directions and motions in space) would reveal equally strong con-
<F,G >, whose members can be possessed by things o f some kind or kinds, K, the ‘mode o f com­
pleteness’ that secures uniqueness and definiteness for the pair is constituted by the abilities o f  
normal members o f K to have features o f the genus (e.g., colors, sizes, weights, etc.) to which F 
and G belong. For some discussion o f this, see Bogen 1992.
nections between the identification o f contraries and other departments o f Aristotelian natural sci­
ence. It would be nice if  someone could find a text in which Aristotle said that his approach to the 
natural sciences had been shaped by his approach to the problems o f change, contrariety, and due 
measure that Plato left him. It would be nice if  someone could find a text in which Aristotle said 
that an advantage o f his approach to natural science was the resources it provided for dealing with 
these problems. W e don’t suppose there ever were any such texts. But we dpn’t need them to ap­
preciate how important the Platonic problems o f contrariety and change were to Aristotle’s work in 
natural science and its philosophy.
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